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COMMENTARY AND DIALOGUE

Am I My Brother’s Keeper: Willful Misconduct and
the Directed Trustee under the Uniform
Directed Trust Act
Jane Ditelberg*
The Uniform Directed Trust Act1 adopted by the Uniform Law
Commission (“ULC”) in 2017 has been enacted in Georgia,2 Michigan,3
and New Mexico,4 and introduced in several other states.5 Professors
Morley and Sitkoff, Chair and Reporter for the UDTA’s drafting committee, have written a thoughtful, thorough article reviewing the details
of the UDTA and the intent of the drafters6 as an aid to legislators considering enactment. Their analysis also contains comparisons to other
directed trustee statutes pre-dating the Uniform Act.7 The purpose of
this response is to evaluate section 9(b) of the UDTA and to challenge
the article’s analysis of that provision.
UDTA section 9(b) states as follows:
A directed trustee must not comply with a trust director’s exercise or nonexercise of a power of direction or further power
under Section 6(b)(1) to the extent that by complying the trustee would engage in willful misconduct.
Morley and Sitkoff refer to this standard of liability for a directed
trustee as both an “innovation”8 and as the current law in Delaware,
Illinois, Texas and Virginia.9 They describe this as a “diminished” duty
for the trustee because the trustee must only “avoid ‘willful misconduct’
* The author is grateful to her colleagues, Susan Snyder, William Fuller and David
Diamond, for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this article.
1 UNIF. DIRECTED TRUST ACT (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017) [hereinafter UDTA].
2 GA. CODE ANN. §§ 53-12-500 to 506 (2018).
3 H.B. 6130, 99th Leg. Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2018), effective Mar. 29, 2019.
4 N.M. STAT. ANN. § 46-14-1 to 18 (2019).
5 As of this printing, Connecticut, Colorado, Nebraska, Rhode Island and Utah are
considering adoption. U N I F . L AW C O M M ’ N , Directed Trust Act, https://
www.uniformlaws.org/committees/community-home?CommunityKey=ca4d8a5a-55d74c43-b494-5f8858885dd8.
6 John D. Morley & Robert H. Sitkoff, Making Directed Trusts Work: The Uniform
Directed Trust Act, 44 ACTEC L.J. 3 (2019).
7 Id. at 39-40.
8 Id. at 10.
9 Id. at 41.
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in deciding whether to comply with a director’s directions.”10 However
they go on to describe the directed trustee as having an added duty, with
the result that the aggregated duties of the advisor and the directed trustee exceed those imposed on a non-directed trustee. They describe this
as simple and intuitive, and claim it has proven successful and workable
in Delaware.11 The drafters, they report, preferred this approach over
the test imposed by statutes in Alaska, Nevada, New Hampshire and
South Dakota, which they describe as imposing no liability on a directed
trustee for following the advisor’s direction, “even if the trustee knows
that the [direction] . . . is a breach of the director’s duty.”12 They also
distinguish the standard under section 808 of the Uniform Trust Code,13
which they indicate was never under serious consideration.14
While the Delaware statute, like the UDTA, uses “willful misconduct” to describe the standard for determining a directed trustee’s liability, the rest of the Delaware statute and its definition of willful
misconduct differ from section 9(b) of the UDTA. The different wording, definition and interpretation result in a significantly different meaning for those words than the one asserted by Morley and Sitkoff.
Their interpretation hinges on a directed trustee’s obligation to
evaluate a direction and make a conscious decision whether or not to
implement it. They describe the standard for evaluating the direction as
whether it would be willful misconduct for the trustee to carry out the
direction.15 This could be interpreted at least two different ways, neither
of which is consistent with the existing law the authors describe as the
source of this duty.
One interpretation of the phrase “would be willful misconduct for
the trustee to carry out the direction” requires the trustee to determine
whether, if the trustee made the same decision, such decision would constitute willful misconduct by the trustee. There is no authority in the
Delaware statute, or that of any other state, for that standard. This approach forces the trustee to substitute its judgment for that of the advisor and assumes that the trustee will have all the information available
to the advisor, which is rarely true with a directed trust.
The other possible interpretation, revealed in Morley’s and
Sitkoff’s example, is that there are some directions that, even if the trustee is not exercising its own will, it is nevertheless willful misconduct for
the trustee to follow. Their example is an advisor’s direction to sell a
10
11
12
13
14
15

Id. at 7.
Id.
Id. at 40.
UNIF. TRUST CODE § 808, (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2000), hereinafter “UTC.”
See Morley & Sitkoff, supra note 6, at 40.
Id. at 41-42.
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trust asset to the advisor’s spouse. Which directions fall into that category is not explained. In addition, the Delaware statute16 and those of
other states imposing a willful misconduct standard expressly relieve a
directed trustee of any duty to review the directions received and of any
duty to warn a beneficiary when the trustee would have acted differently.17 Furthermore, this interpretation is inconsistent with the Delaware statute’s definition of “willful misconduct.”
Delaware Trust Code section 3313(b) states,
If a governing instrument provides that a fiduciary is to follow
the direction of an adviser . . . , and the fiduciary acts in accordance with such a direction, then except in cases of wilful misconduct on the part of the fiduciary so directed, the fiduciary
shall not be liable for any loss resulting directly or indirectly
from any such act.18
The Delaware statute19 helpfully defines “willful misconduct:”
“[W]ilful misconduct” means intentional wrongdoing, not mere
negligence, gross negligence or recklessness and “wrongdoing”
means malicious conduct or conduct designed to defraud or
seek an unconscionable advantage.
Thus in Delaware a directed trustee is not liable “except in cases of willful misconduct on the part of the fiduciary directed.”20 Such liability
arises out of the specific misconduct of the directed trustee, and not
from the contents of the direction or “associative” misconduct in carrying out the direction of an advisor who himself breaches his fiduciary
duty. It does not require the directed trustee to evaluate the directions it
receives; it requires the directed trustee to avoid its own willful misconduct in implementing the direction.
The Delaware statute also provides,
[T]he actions of the fiduciary pertaining to matters within the
scope of the adviser’s authority (such as confirming that the
adviser’s directions have been carried out and recording and
reporting actions taken at the adviser’s direction), shall be presumed to be administrative actions taken by the fiduciary
solely to allow the fiduciary to perform those duties assigned to
the fiduciary under the governing instrument and such administrative actions shall not be deemed to constitute an undertak16
17
18
19
20

DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3313(b) (2018).
Id. § 3313(e).
Id. § 3313(b) (emphasis added).
Id. § 3301(h)(4).
Id. § 3313(b).
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ing by the fiduciary to monitor the adviser or otherwise
participate in actions within the scope of the adviser’s
authority.21
The article describes UDTA section 9(b) as imposing the usual fiduciary
duties on the advisor and an additional duty on the directed trustee “to
avoid willful misconduct”22 which by virtue of their example refers to
willful misconduct on the part of the advisor, that is to say the advisor’s
direction to gain an unconscionable advantage by selling trust property
to the advisor’s spouse.23 The language of the Delaware statute refutes
any assertion that the UDTA, as interpreted in the article, reflects Delaware law.
The Illinois statue, also cited in the article in support of the willful
misconduct standard, stands in even starker contrast:
if a governing instrument provides that an excluded fiduciary is
to follow the direction of a directing party, and such excluded
fiduciary acts in accordance with such a direction, then except
in cases of willful misconduct on the part of the excluded fiduciary in complying with the direction of the directing party, the
excluded fiduciary is not liable for any loss resulting directly or
indirectly from following any such direction . . . .24
The growing body of case law on directed trusts supports this interpretation of the pre-UDTA directed trust statutes, and the courts have, in
nearly all cases,25 specifically declined to impose a duty on the directed
trustee to review, monitor, or evaluate the advisor’s directions.26
21

Id. § 3313(e) (emphasis added).
Morley & Sitkoff, supra note 6, at 42.
23 Id. at 40.
24 760 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/16.3(f)(1) (2015) (emphasis added). The other statutes
cited in support of Morley and Sitkoff’s interpretation of the willful misconduct standard
are similar. See, e.g., the Virginia Trust Code, which refers to “willful misconduct or gross
negligence on the part of the directed trustee,” VA. CODE ANN. § 64.2-770(E)(2) (2014)
(emphasis added); see also TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 114.0031(f)-(g) (West 2015).
25 The exception is Rollins v. Branch Banking & Trust Co., 56 Va. Cir. 147 (2001),
where the court concluded that the directed trustee was not liable for the investment
decisions of the advisor but did have, under common law, a duty to warn the beneficiaries. Since most directed trust statutes expressly eliminate a duty to warn, this case
may no longer be relevant.
26 Duemler v. Wilmington Tr. Co., No. 20033 NC, 2004 WL 5383502 (Del Ch. Oct.
22, 2004); Shelton v. Tamposi, 62 A.3d 741 (N.H. 2013). See also Peter S. Gordon &
Michael M. Gordon, Why is Everyone Talking About Delaware Trusts, https://
www.gfmlaw.com/sites/default/files/pdfs/Why%20is%20Everyone%20Talking%20
About%20Delaware%20Trusts.pdf, at 38-39 (2016) (discussing Friedman v. U.S. Tr. Co.
of Del., C.A. No. 20205 NC (Del. Ch. 2003)).
22

Spring 2019]

AM I MY BROTHER’S KEEPER?

211

These statutes27 focus on the potential willful misconduct of a directed trustee in implementing directions. Although the authors claim
the drafters of the UDTA incorporate the same standard, they have in
fact turned it on its head. No law is cited by them as the source of the
directed trustee’s duty to evaluate the direction and determine (a)
whether it would be willful misconduct if the directed trustee itself were
to have taken the action directed, or (b) if the direction constitutes the
advisor’s willful misconduct. Morley’s and Sitkoff’s effort to equate the
UDTA provision to existing directed trust statues is inapt, and legislators considering enactment need to understand the distinction and its
consequences for grantors, directing parties, and directed trustees.
What should a directed trustee do upon receipt of a direction to sell
an asset to the advisor’s spouse? Under the Illinois and Delaware statutes, the answer is clear: carry out the sale. The trustee would be liable
for a loss if through willful misconduct the trustee failed to sell the asset,
sold the wrong asset, or failed to consummate the sale on the terms the
advisor directed. But if the decision of the advisor is carried out, the
consequences of the decision are, and should be, the responsibility of
the advisor whether the decision is simply poor investment advice or
constitutes misconduct by the advisor (e.g. the sale to the spouse is at a
price or on terms disadvantageous to the trust). If those acts are misconduct, they are the misconduct of the advisor.
The directed trustee under the UDTA, however, faces a different
calculus. According to Morley and Sitkoff, the drafters of the UDTA
intended to impose a new duty on directed trustees to disregard certain
directions, but were silent on which ones to disregard. That trustee must
determine whether following the direction “would be willful misconduct” by the trustee. Does this decision rest on whether it would be
willful misconduct if the trustee made the same decision? On whether it
would be willful misconduct if the trustee made the same decision,
under the same circumstances (i.e. its own conflict of interest), even if
those circumstances do not apply to the directed trustee? And how, if it
has no duty to review, will the trustee know that the terms are disadvantageous? A direction to sell asset A to person B does not on its face
reveal that B is the advisor’s spouse, or whether the sale is occurring
with the consent of the beneficiaries, or is pursuant to a pre-existing
option agreement. Perhaps there is no other buyer, and the sale of the
asset is necessary to diversify the portfolio, to generate income, or to
provide liquidity for tax payments. The fiduciary making the decision
(the advisor) needs to consider all of these issues which will not be apparent to a directed trustee. And under the existing statutes it is clear
27 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3313(b) (2018); 760 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/16.3(f)(1);
TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 114.0031(f)-(g); VA. CODE ANN. § 64.2-770(E)(2).
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that the trustee does not have a duty to second-guess this decision, or to
make its own separate evaluation of these factors.
Calling the UDTA’s standard a “willful misconduct” standard is a
misnomer. What does willful mean in this context? According to
Black’s, the definition of willful is, “voluntary and intentional, but not
necessarily malicious.”28 In a directed trust, the only party who has a
design or intention with respect to the directed action is the advisor. In
Morley’s and Sitkoff’s example (selling trust property to the advisor’s
spouse), any “malicious” intent belongs to the advisor, not the trustee.
The directed trustee is appointed by a grantor not to opine but to
accede to the advisor’s decision. The bifurcation of duties is often intended to enable the advisor to direct actions the trustee would not itself
take. Grantors may expect advisors to approve retention of investment
concentrations, favor one group of beneficiaries over another in making
distributions, or invest in assets about which the directed trustee lacks
expertise. The purpose of a directed trust is undermined if the trustee, to
avoid liability, must substitute its own judgment for the advisor’s.
Morley and Sitkoff note that states enacting the UDTA may want
to choose a different standard of liability.29 They suggest that the other
option is to provide that the directed trustee is never liable for directed
actions. The choice is not so starkly binary; in addition to the actual
Delaware approach is the one described below.
In my view, there are some actions that a trustee, directed or not,
cannot take under any circumstances because they are unlawful. Examples of such actions include money laundering, violating currency restrictions, engaging in fraud, or making material misrepresentations.
The trustee should be prohibited from implementing these directions,
not because of the willful misconduct of the advisor, and not because it
would be willful misconduct if the trustee made the same decision, but
because the directed trustee should not knowingly violate applicable
laws. And no grantor or advisor should expect a trustee, directed or not,
to behave otherwise.
UDTA section 9(b) could be revised to focus on the lawfulness of
the direction:
A directed trustee must not comply with a trust director’s exercise or nonexercise of a power of direction or further power
under Section 6(b)(1) to the extent that by complying the trustee would engage in willful misconduct the directed trustee is
thereby directed to knowingly violate the laws or regulations of
any jurisdiction applicable to the trust. For purposes of this sec28
29

Willful, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
Morley & Sitkoff, supra note 6, at 32.
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tion, “knowingly” shall mean “known by the trustee based
upon the contents of the direction and any information provided by the trust director therewith.” The directed trustee
may reasonably rely upon advice of legal counsel to determine
what actions would be consistent with or contrary to applicable
law. Reasonable expenses incurred by the directed trustee in
good faith for legal review of an instruction from a directing
party or a petition for judicial instructions regarding its authority to comply with a direction shall be proper expenses of the
trust.
The standard of liability under section 9(b) of the UDTA is not only
inconsistent with the law in Delaware and other jurisdictions but represents a shift in responsibility from the advisor (chosen by the grantor to
act) to the directed trustee. Legislators adopting the UDTA should consider what standard of liability best enables the fiduciaries of a directed
trust to carry out the grantor’s intent that responsibilities be bifurcated
and fairly allocates liability for decisions to the party making the decision, rather than the one implementing it.

